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Abstract
Algorithms are increasingly affecting us in our daily lives. They seem to be everywhere, yet they are seldom seen by the
humans dealing with the consequences that result from them. Yet, in recent theorisations, there is a risk that the
algorithm is being given too much prominence. This article addresses the interaction between algorithmic outputs and
the humans engaging with them by drawing on studies of two distinct empirical fields – self-quantification and audit
controls of taxpayers. We explore recalibration as a way to understand the practices and processes involved when, on the
one hand, decisions are made based on results from algorithmic calculations in counting and accounting software, and on
the other hand, when decisions are made based on human experience/knowledge. In particular, we are concerned with
moments when an algorithmic output differs from expectations of ‘normalcy’ and ‘normativity’ in any given situation.
This could be a ‘normal’ relation between sales and VAT deductions for a business, or a ‘normal’ number of steps one
takes in a day, or ‘normative’ as it is according to the book, following guidelines and recommendations from other
sources. In these moments, we argue that a process of recalibration occurs – an effortful moment where, rather than
treat the algorithmic output as given, individuals’ tacit knowledge, experiences and intuition are brought into play to
address the deviation from the normal and normative.
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Introduction
Algorithms seem to be everywhere. Recent scholarship
suggests an increasing proliferation of digitisation in
decision-making across, and within, organisations, cor-
porations and bureaucracies (Domingos, 2015; Lyon,
2014; McQuillan, 2015). For the end-user, this digitisa-
tion often appears as a maze where only the outcome is
seen, and the enormous impact this is having in peo-
ple’s everyday life is already under examination (e.g.
Isin and Ruppert, 2015; Striphas, 2015; Zarsky, 2016).
In this article, we discuss how humans make decisions
when engaging with systems and devices that produce
algorithmic outputs. We aim to shed light on situations
where algorithms propose a way, a solution, a move, to
return a situation to a state of normalcy. What happens
when an algorithmic output does not resonate with
human expectations of what should be normal?
Under what circumstances does the human feel able
to reject the algorithmic output, and when does the
algorithm win out?
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Our two empirical fields are very distinct – self-quanti-
fication and the sampling of taxpayers for audit – but both
derive from the ontological concern of the impact of algo-
rithms on everyday decisions. We are concerned with
moments when an algorithmic output differs from the
tacit knowledge of ‘normalcy’ in any given situation – be
this the ‘normal’ relation between sales and VAT deduc-
tions for a business, or the ‘normal’ amount of steps one
ought to take in a day. By introducing three varieties of
the concept recalibration, we draw attention to the many
instances where algorithmic output is questioned and the
implications such questioning have for further action.
In the first part of the article, recalibration is proposed
as a way to account for the multiple other considerations
that need to be made when examining phenomenon invol-
ving algorithms – including human and contextual deci-
sion-making processes. These are instances depicting the
human work that takes results from algorithmic calcula-
tions in various counting and accounting software and
compares these results with circumstantial expectations
on what is normal. Such expectations are referred to as
tacit knowledge; the particular set of embodied know-
ledge practices that can be revealed by ethnographic
and critical engagements (see Elyachar, 2012; cf.
Kockelman, 2007; Strathern, 2005). Although we do not
delve into the tacit knowledge per se, it provides the neces-
sary backdrop for understanding the circumstances in
which recalibration of the algorithmic output occurs.
In the next section, we locate the human–algorithm
relation that we find in moments of decision making in
our cases within the current literature. We concur with
many recent theorisations; that the algorithm is at risk of
being given too much prominence in practices that form
the world (e.g. Pink et al., 2017). Although algorithms
might be everywhere, there are many environments, con-
texts, and instances where humans still tinker with algo-
rithmically produced results not just following their
recommendations and instructions. Instead they may
reject, adapt, ignore or as we propose – recalibrate –
the algorithmic output. We illustrate instances of recali-
bration with two empirical cases. Our first case is based
on controls at the Swedish Tax Agency, where tax audi-
tors check for unsolicited cost deductions in annual tax
statements. The second case draws on the practices of
self-quantification, where the self is counted using tech-
nologies and devices to gain an account of the self. We
conclude our article teasing out instances when humans
bow to the algorithmic solution.
At first glance, our cases may seem disparate in
many ways, yet we find commonalities in how our
informants relate to algorithmic outputs that propose
an action and accordingly recalibrate their decisions.
Both our cases build on long and extensive ethno-
graphic fieldwork. Lotta Björklund Larsen (henceforth
LBL) followed a risk assessment project at the Agency
for its entire duration of three years: from its initiation,
through the research phase, intermingled with presen-
tations of its conclusions within the Agency and to see
the final project report finally buried (Björklund
Larsen, 2017). The resulting material builds on over
100 hours of transcribed meetings and interviews at
the Agency, all their internal e-mails, policy regulations
and instructions for their work, as well as copies of
work in progress. A substantial part of this project
was a random audit control; the largest ever performed
by the regional department specialising in such audits
and is the focus of this article.
Farzana Dudhwala (henceforth FD) spent five years
with members of the Quantified Self (QS), predomin-
antly based in London. She attended 26 Meetups
(events run by, and for, members of the QS to share
learnings and experiences of self-tracking, watched 113
‘show and tell’ presentations (the predominant format to
share said learnings and experiences), did 32 interviews,
and participated in two QS ‘unconferences’ (unstruc-
tured conferences where sessions are formed from inter-
est in the participants). There were extensive field notes
taken throughout these ethnographic engagements, as
well as transcriptions of all of the interviews.
The data from both our projects was input into
NVivo software to then be coded iteratively to make
sense of the themes coming out of it. The vignettes and
quotes chosen for this paper are used to make broader
points about the concepts that are derived from them,
and specifically because they were deemed to be fairly
typical of the kinds of behaviour seen throughout.
We have each participated in our respective
groups’ activities, be that performing audits or using
self tracking devices; we have observed what our inform-
ants do; and we have scrutinised how they engage with
the technologies given to them. In doing so, in each of
these two cases, we have been able to examine moments
where recalibration of varying degrees has taken place.
Recalibration to normalcy
According to the Cambridge dictionary, recalibration is
defined as changing the way one does, or thinks, about
something. This definition is distinct from calibration,
which refers to checking the accuracy of a measuring
instrument. The difference is small, yet important.
Strictly speaking, a calibration is the act of using a set
standard to compare a measure against the thing it is
actually measuring; it does not include any subsequent
adjustment of behaviour. Recalibration, on the other
hand, describes how a decision or thought changes or
is adapted given various types of input. It is, in other
words, to carefully assess or adjust something based on
information other than a normative set standard as the
outcome of an algorithm often is. Such information may
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be previous experience, instinct, or common sense, etc. –
tacit knowledge. The aim of this paper is to specifically
address human interaction between the output of algo-
rithms and the subsequent decision(s) made as a result.
This process is what we call recalibration and it occurs
when an activity that involves counting or accounting
through an algorithm does not fit with reasonable expect-
ations of the outcome by the human decision maker.
Our use of recalibration also involves an understand-
ing of what normalcy implies. In the case of quantifying
the self, specific numbers are often given as a ‘target’ or
‘goal’ to which one is expected to aspire to – for exam-
ple, taking an average of 10,000 steps a day was often
cited as a worthy aim and this number therefore
became normative for many from which variations
were seen as deviations – whether good or bad. That
derivation of normalcy was obtained in the absolute,
where the figure in itself had achieved status of normal
condition. But normalcy may also be gauged in relativ-
ity. In auditing practices, absolute numbers are often
less important than a number relative to others: a cor-
poration’s registered VAT amount or stock value, for
example, only makes sense when compared with the
total business turnover. The algorithmic output is the
result of a calibration, whereas recalibration occurs
when human considerations of contextual, relative,
and other factors are brought into the situation and
thus the course of action changes, however slightly.
Making a decision about and changing the course of
an action one takes is then not only about following the
numbers given by the algorithm, but about taking into
consideration knowledge or expectations about the
normal condition – what the algorithmic output is rea-
sonably expected to be, given other information. Based
on these considerations, do people base decisions on the
resulting numbers given by the algorithm, or by trust-
ing their own knowledge of what the number is sup-
posed to measure? Or, perhaps, is there something else
going on entirely? We are therefore not looking at the
recalibration of the algorithm itself but rather we focus
on how the output from the algorithm is used in adjust-
ing the expectations one has of normalcy and how sub-
sequent decisions are made.
Based on our ethnographic engagements, we found
three varieties of such recalibration. Relative recalibra-
tion denotes a comparison between various numbers
suggested by the algorithmic systems. These can be
algorithmic calculations, hard-coded recommendations
set by the system or other instructions that the human
follows. Tacit recalibration illustrates the process where
the algorithmic output is set in relation to what is the
human’s own experience of such instances. In these
situations, humans trust their own knowledge of the
best way to create normal situations. Anomalous recali-
bration relates to abnormal, even dangerous, situations
where the algorithmic output is trusted. Here, the
human seldom questions the algorithm’s correctness;
the human knowledge is deemed inferior and incom-
plete to what the algorithms can produce.
As Bateson (1972: xxiv) argued, ‘[A]n explorer can
never know what he is exploring until it has been
explored’. Through recalibration, we can explore what
algorithms do as part of a larger whole, neither giving
them a defined and specific role at the outset, nor setting
them apart as a category of their own – as ‘algorithmic
configurations’. Algorithms are ‘there’ but the user seldom
knows what they actually do. Recalibration looks at
instances when the algorithmic outcome is given prece-
dence despite tacit knowledge, as well as those instances
when tacit human knowledge wins out in the face of the
algorithmic output – how is this done? To answer these
questions, we turn to examples from both counting and
accounting to show how recalibration can figure into deci-
sions made both at a larger scale involving decisions made
about others, as well as the more private and intimate level
about one’s own self. Although these human actors recali-
brate in different capacities, they all refer and compare
their decisions to a perceived state of normalcy. Before
turning to our fields of study, we situate our take on algo-
rithms in the existing literature.
Locating the algorithm
Algorithms are seldom seen for humans dealing with
their results as they hide deep down in software pro-
grammes, obscured by computer code languages and
are thus inaccessible to most (Deville and van der
Velden, 2016). As an algorithm is ‘a process or set of
rules to be followed in calculations or other problem-
solving operations, especially by a computer’ (New
Oxford American Dictionary), one may be tempted to
try and locate the specific ‘process or set of rules’ to
interrogate it. Yet, as algorithms are constantly chan-
ging (see Kubler, 2017; Seaver, 2013), focussing too
much on the algorithm itself can be akin to a dog chas-
ing its own tail. The focus here is to disentangle the
various aspects of decision-making in relation to algo-
rithmic outputs, and this is where Paul Dourish’s (2016)
proposal is a useful starting point (cf. Wirth, 1977).
First, he points to the need for separating how data is
made available for algorithmic processing from how the
result of the calculations is handled. Second, he high-
lights the puzzle of how to identify the algorithms in the
maze of digital locations when they themselves are sub-
ject to constant change (cf. Gillespie, 2017). Third, he
argues that we need to be attune to the temporalities of
algorithms, where certain algorithms are selected, re-
used, re-made and spread to other users and contexts.
This fuels Dourish’s fourth and final point, that the
study of algorithms could be ethnographic – putting
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the gaze on the communities constructing and working
with algorithms. It is the latter work of algorithms that
we turn our attention to in this article.
Rather than focus on the algorithm in isolation, we
thus study how ‘algorithms do work in the world’
(Kitchin, 2017: 22; cf. Ziewitz, 2017). We put the gaze
on communities using algorithmic output, after the
algorithms have purportedly done their job. As we
will show, there is not a universal acceptance of their
outcome, and there is much more at play than just the
algorithmic output. We need to take into account how
decisions are made with algorithms where decisions
draw on the tacit knowledge of the given situation.
Whilst algorithms certainly do work in the world,
they do so in interaction with users who are not neces-
sarily knowledgeable about the actual content of the
algorithms but only of the output they produce. Such
outputs are seen on computer screens, digital displays
and even on old fashioned paper printouts. Yet, as we
will show the output of algorithms does not always
determine further action. We investigate if something
general can be said about what aspects are considered
when a human decides to trust her tacit knowledge
instead of the result from the algorithms.
From the outset, we consider algorithmic output to
be part of a larger network of actors (cf. Latour, 2005).
Michel Callon and Fabian Muniesa (2005), for exam-
ple, suggest the term ‘algorithmic configurations’ in
their study of how commodities are priced when com-
puters were involved in price-setting. Price-setting is
determined by algorithms, but never in isolation.
‘Algorithmic configurations’ describe how algorithms
are part of a market practice that weaves together the
goods, agents and exchanges and define prices on a
variety of markets; from the Paris bourse, to the
Marseille open-door fish market, right through to the
decision of a customer doing their weekly shop at the
supermarket. In particular, we note Callon and
Muniesa’s (2005: 1245) point that regardless of how
calculations are made, there is ‘not a single implacable
logic, one that is becoming hegemonic: that of calcula-
tion as the only possibility for action’.
Malte Ziewitz’s (2017) not-so-random walk through
the streets and alleys of Oxford is also a useful inspir-
ation to us where humans adapt to the outputs of an
algorithm. In an experiment with an algorithm that
gives him ad hoc instructions on where to turn at
each junction, he engages with the instructions as ‘prac-
tical reasoning’ (Ziewitz, 2017: 2). Instead of analysing
the logics of the algorithm itself, he deliberates with its
suggestions while observing and engaging with the sur-
roundings he meets on his stroll. He cannot always
make the turns as suggested: the algorithm he brought
with him was not specific about whether an alley should
count as a public road; it did not take into account
where to run in a Y-junction; and he is not allowed
to cross a private car-park. To our mind, his practical
reasoning resonates with recalibrating engaging with
what he experiences in the world.
In one sense, we could see the results of his algorithms
as being ‘broken’, a concept that Sarah Pink et al. (2018)
propose in a study of varieties of empirical fields. They
emphasise that even all the dysfunctional, decaying, out-
dated data need to be taken into account when studying
digitalisation, to account for ‘broken’ algorithms. It is an
important aspect to consider, although broken is per-
haps a too strong a word for our case. We instead main-
tain that the algorithmic outputs that we study need
continuous tinkering and maintenance to adapt to a
changing world. In line with Ziewitz’s (2017: 11) sugges-
tion, therefore, we investigate what happens when we
study ‘algorithms not as objects to be known in theory
but as figures to be used in practice’. As both Callon and
Muniesa, as well as Ziewitz, show, algorithms do not
lead blindly to future actions. These are the instances
in which we argue that the algorithmic outputs need
recalibration. We now turn to our empirical cases to
show how this works in practice.
An audit control at the Swedish
Tax Agency
Audit controls are one of the tools the Swedish Tax
Agency use to make sure taxpayers report the right
information and pay the right tax in on time. Such an
audit is a systematic and independent verification of
(financial) accounts and documents of an organisation
or individual to ensure that they present a true and fair
view of their activities and follow the law. An audit
aims to ‘draw conclusions from a limited inspection
of documents, such as budgets and written representa-
tions, in addition to reliance on oral testimony and
direct observation’ (Power, 2000: 111). For a tax
administration, the ultimate goal of an audit is to
ensure that a taxpayer reports and pays the correct
tax that is owed – the normal situation. A Swedish
audit control is heavily regulated by law and there are
two standard types of controls; the ‘desk control’ and
the more intrusive ‘audit control’ which involves a visit
to the taxpayer.
This Agency has an astonishing standing among
Swedish governmental authorities and is, since the
last 10 years, among the top-contenders of the citizens’
most trusted governmental authorities. The Agency
says it has obtained such a standing by being active,
trustworthy and helpful (Skatteverket, 2013). They
apply these values in their four public strategies:
make sure all taxpayers do the right thing; earn the
trust of citizens and corporations; ensure that all pay
the right tax; and simplify the taxation process for all.
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Audit controls address all the Agency strategies while
paying careful attention to the values they are said to
enact (Björklund Larsen, 2017). It is thus of particular
interest to see how auditors handle intrusive audits
based on calculations from tax returns while enacting
the Agency values of being active, trustworthy and
helpful.
This particular audit control was part of a large
risk assessment project that the Agency undertook in
2010–2013. A random control, slumpkontroll, is a seem-
ing contradiction in terms. To control, steer, and dis-
cipline the haphazard and irregular appears a daunting,
if almost impossible task. It is making the irregular
regular. A random audit control is a statistical project
where human intervention is large; the challenge is to
work in a consistent and uniform way, both in the
sampling procedures and in the aim for equal treatment
of taxpayers regardless of who conducts the audit. Tax
collectors have tried out many different ways of iden-
tifying those most prone to make errors (Skatteverket,
2014); currently it means that the Agency has access to
really Big Data and foresees revolutionary changes in
its way of working with the advances, even disruptions,
in technology. Yet, it is still up to individual tax audi-
tor(s) to choose which measure should be applied in any
given case and suggest what the tax ought to be for
taxpayers that are seen to have reported questionable
data. One of these measures could be to change the
decision of taxation, another to require that additional
information be given, a third measure could be no
action at all (see Figure 1).1
The actual selection of taxpayers for audit is con-
ducted according to strict statistical sampling methods.
A third of Sweden’s population of small businesses was
found in the four selected regions, in total 100,000.
When analysts do not know the extent of wrongdoing,
50% is automatically assumed. With a statistical confi-
dence interval of 10%, 45–55% of these businesses were
assumed to deduct incorrect costs, resulting in a min-
imum of 383 entities to audit. This number was
adjusted upwards to 400, but as it was also assumed
that there would be some taxpayers found without any
business activity, as well as some unable to be reached,
a final list of 450 was randomly selected.
Once a taxpayer is selected for audit, the question of
what issues the human auditor considers when follow-
ing or overriding the suggestions made by the
algorithms arises. The audit control depicted below
focuses on unreasonable costs for small businesses.
Finding unreasonable costs implies an assumption of
what reasonable costs are; a comparison against
normal costs. An audit control is not just an inspection
of documents supported by oral testimonies and direct
observation as Power (2000: 111) suggested, but an
algorithmic task unpacking the calculated output; the
additions and subtractions, the depreciations, etc. that
the taxpayer has calculated and entered into particular
posts on the tax return statement.
Alice, an experienced tax auditor at the Agency,
takes LBL through all the steps in the audit control
procedure. It aims to ensure a consistent way of work-
ing for all 40 auditors taking part in this particular
Figure 1. Audit control process.
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audit control. Alice shows queries and memos made in
different data systems, the binder with the auditees’
physical documentation, the logbook recording each
step of the audit, the diary registrations procedure she
has to go through at each step of official contact with
the audited entity, and the different letter templates for
written communications. To ensure a uniform audit
control there are 17 checklists in total: procedural
instructions, information materials, and questionnaires
to follow during phone contacts and visits. Ten work-
ing days are allocated to each audited taxpayer; two-
thirds of the time involves administrative tasks and
one-third concerns actual auditing.
Alice gathers information about the taxpayer from
numerous registers and databases and notes them in the
first checklist in order to make a plan to support a
formal decision for the control audit of this particular
taxpayer. A letter is sent to the taxpayer informing
about the upcoming audit control including a visit.
Alice follows each checklist but also works in her
own way using her extensive experience. She says she
increasingly uses her computer, happily acknowledging
her two screens that allow her access to double the
amount of information at the same time. For each
audited taxpayer she has created a (physical) binder
that fills up with material as the audit control proceeds.
For example, after the visit she typically returns with
the taxpayer’s invoices and receipts, often accompanied
by a data file with the ledger. Importantly, she also
gathers knowledge about the audited subject during
the telephone call(s) and by visual impressions at
the visit.
Alice finds the audit visits very informative. It is
really a gift to go on a visit, she says, as you then
understand more about taxpayers’ business activities.
Seeing their ‘reality’ makes the audit control simpler.
Most people are very patient, some are a bit unsure and
afraid and then you have to be smooth. After she and
her colleague pose their questions, which they are very
careful not to make into an interrogation, they ask to
bring supporting material back to the Agency office.
Alice does not believe in the proposition that an orderly
book-keeping reflects an orderly business. There are so
many people who are very practical; they might be ter-
rific performing their job which might not be mirrored
in their book-keeping of these activities. There might
also be sickness or other problems that make their
book-keeping and other paperwork lag.
Alice tries to understand the everyday business real-
ity of the people she audits and aims to be reasonable in
her decision of which costs can be deducted. Her rea-
sonableness commences with the first phone call and
continues at the actual visit. Although they only want
to see what concerns business activities, they often pass
through the home. Alice can then see what can be
considered assets. Are there paintings on the walls?
How separate is the ‘office’ from the rest of the
home? If any computers or cars are present, they can
ask if these are also used for private use? If they see
other things that are not needed for the business they
audit, they can ask about them. Alice says:
We should always pose the question ‘‘how do you use
this thing?’’ This means that we listen to the taxpayer.
We aim to create an understanding for the work we do,
but also that we try to understand how they work. If we
get off on the wrong foot, the audit might be unneces-
sarily long and cumbersome and we might irritate
them. You know, we aim to interfere as little as possible
so that they think we do our job well and with quality.
By understanding as much as possible of the taxpayers’
business activities, the auditors can claim to be reason-
able in their control. Glancing into the taxpayers’ pri-
vate life, Alice expects that the audited subject ought to
behave in a cooperative and reasonable way and com-
mensurate with his business role for – and especially
with regard to what costs she/he deducts.
Back at the office, Alice starts the actual audit alter-
nating between calculated information on her computer
screens, the uploaded ledger from the auditee, a check-
list of issues to look into. She considers and compares
the relation between numbers that can indicate wrong-
doings. Is there a large storage value but little turnover?
Is a cash posting negative? Has a corrected VAT entry
not been registered with the Agency? Are relations
strange between different posts such as a lot of
income yet little VAT? The actual audit is a continuous
recalibration among and between various digital
information.
Alice unpacks book-keeping posts, for example
looking for invoices for purchases that seem irrelevant
for the business, information that can also be found by
browsing through some of the physical binder. She usu-
ally choose those for December or the end of the
accounting year looking for purchases that seem irrele-
vant. It could be an invoice for a bed, bookshelves or
other things that can be used outside business activities.
Recalibration also includes her understanding of the
taxpayer’s business and the impression from the visit.
In addition, Alice always has to pay attention to
Agency values; she needs to be reasonable in her judge-
ment. But there are limits to how understanding an
auditor can be. Alice recalls an audit control of a con-
sultant who had a big new screen prominently placed in
his private living room, but the invoice was part of the
book-keeping, a cost he could not deduct. A large TV
screen could be very important for a business; Alice
herself is very happy about her two screens. But here
it is the location of the screen – in the taxpayers living
6 Big Data & Society
room – that makes it an invalid cost for the business.
Correcting the tax return brings the taxpayer back to
normalcy for the work of a tax auditor.
Recalibration in the quantification of self
Self-quantification is the practice through which people
use (most often digital) technologies to track, measure,
and record certain aspects of their behaviour and self.
Digital self-tracking technologies exist in many differ-
ent forms. Wearable technologies such as the Fitbit,
Nike Fuelband, and Jawbone Up (devices that the
user wears on the wrist to record steps taken using an
in-built accelerometer), blood glucose monitors that
measure blood sugar levels, wifi-enabled scales to
track weight, mobile applications used to measure
and analyse sleep patterns, monitor menstruation
cycles, track calories, runs, and bike rides, are all exam-
ples of the types of self-quantifying technologies used.
The practice of self-quantification has evolved
beyond ‘early adopters’ and has become much more
mainstream since it was formalised in late 2008 through
the group known as the ‘Quantified Self’. On the face of
it, self-quantification involves using a technology of
some sort to quantify the self in pursuit of increased
self-knowledge – the motto of the ‘Quantified Self’ is
‘Self knowledge through numbers’. Often, people use
devices which have algorithms built into them that
turn the data into information, and this information
will – either implicitly or explicitly – have particular
courses of action associated with them. For example,
a blood glucose device may tell the user that they have 4
mmol/L glucose in their system and this, with the
knowledge of ‘normal’ blood glucose ranges, might
imply that a dose of insulin is required. Someone
using a sleep app may find that their device advises or
recommends that they go to bed earlier so that they
have their full 8 hours of sleep. In the former example,
the information was not given as a direct instruction for
action, but knowledge about that particular measure-
ment implies a certain action to be taken (if hypogly-
cemia is to be avoided). In the latter example, the
instruction is much more explicit – it is telling the
user what they ought to do (see Figure 2).
In many instances of self-quantification, these algo-
rithmic outputs inform or advise users about particular
behaviours or states of health. Much like the algorith-
mic recommendations at the Tax Agency, the algorith-
mic outputs here are not stand-alone readings devoid of
context – as discussed above, these outputs may only
imply certain realities or potentialities by virtue of the
user’s own knowledge surrounding the greater context
about what they are tracking and what expectations of
normalcy might be.
Emma, for example, is a member of the QS group
interviewed by FD. She had been using the ‘My Days’
app on her phone to track her menstruation and her
bowel movements. My Days is used to predict fertility
levels, ovulation, basal metabolic temperature, cervical
mucus, and other related data. Emma had been having
irregular and infrequent bowel movements for around
two years, and seemed to think that this was not an
Figure 2. Process of self-quantification.
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issue, in fact, she indicated that she thought it might
even be convenient, at least until she started to use the
My Days app:
I used to have a problem, well I still have a problem,
with constipation. And, that’s another reason why
I started using the MyDays things, and it’s probably
been like two years so I kind of sometimes think that
OK I don’t have a problem, but . . . sometimes your per-
ception is totally different from the facts when they’re
actually in front of your face.
When I started putting stuff on MyDays app and
started tracking when I go – when I use the toilet –
and actually I’ve realised that I have a massive problem
because sometimes there are weeks when I go to
the toilet only twice a week! And if I kind of go
that’s great, but one thing I’m facing is Bowel
Cancer, right?
Interestingly, Emma makes the instant distinction
between her ‘perceptions’ and the ‘facts’ in front of
her face. The facts for her are the algorithmically
derived results gained through using her app. There is
a very clear sense here that she puts these ‘facts’ above
her own perceptions of what is going on. She uses the
results from the app and considers them alongside
assumptions about what is a normal number of times
one ought to be opening their bowels, and what might
be the consequence if one falls outside of these normal
parameters. The recalibration of her constipation issues
from being a scenario which may have been seen as
somewhat convenient, to one in which she worries
about the potential of bowel cancer shows how a dis-
crepancy in algorithmic outputs and expectations of
normalcy can result in changes in intuitions and the
narratives given to felt experiences. In this case, her
own feelings about the consequences of not opening
her bowels more frequently and consistently (conveni-
ence) are recalibrated by the possible consequences
implied by the algorithmic ‘facts’ laid bare through
the charts on her app (bowel cancer).
Of course, the recalibration does not always have to
side with the algorithmic output. There are many
instances where the user might push back against
what the device or technology indicates to them.
Stephen, another member of the QS who was using a
sleep-band and an associated app called Zio, described
to FD how he grappled with tapping into his own intu-
ition rather than automatically following the algorith-
mic reading on the device:
FD: Has there ever been a time where you thought your
sleep was one thing but then Zio would tell you some-
thing different?
Stephen: Yes. Yeah that has happened.
FD: And what sort of stuff do you do to . . . what do
you tend to agree with?
Stephen: So there is a tendency to trust the technology
a bit too much: so thinking that if Zio tells me I have
had a bad night then it means I must have a bad night –
and I think it’s easy to give up our responsibility for
that kind of that thing, to let the technology lead us,
when really we should be first asking ‘‘Well how do I
feel? Do I feel okay? And comparing that with
‘‘What does Zio say?’’ It’s very easy to not do that
I think so I don’t know the answer to your question
really as to what I go with.
Stephen questioned whether or not to take what the
algorithm and/or technology said as being the ‘truth’.
He reflected that of course you should be asking about
how you feel before you blindly accept what the algo-
rithm and/or technology is telling you, but that it is
difficult to do that part and much easier to just take
the device for granted. The negotiation that Stephen
has about whether to trust the algorithmic outputs, or
to take himself seriously as a reliable judge of his own
sleep is a great moment in which to show how recali-
bration involves more than just an algorithm.
Algorithmically determined sleep quality is, it turns
out, a good example of when algorithmic output is
often questioned using intuition and experience.
Another QS informant, Tamar, showed how the read-
ing on his device was rejected altogether as he com-
pared his algorithmically derived sleep analysis with
his own intuitions and recollection of how his night
went:
There have been numerous occasions when I’ve
looked at that readout in the morning and it says
‘‘Congratulations you’ve got 98% efficiency.’’ And
I’ve sat here and questioned it because I think that
I’ve not slept all that well. There are numerous occa-
sions, I mean very frequently, where it says ‘‘You took
7 minutes to fall asleep.’’ When I know damn well I was
laying there for 20 minutes or more.
Tamar’s reflection highlights an instance where the
algorithm seems to be too far removed from the felt
intuitions, and therefore the algorithm is not enough
to convince him that he had a good sleep. There are
also some instances where the algorithmic output is
used as a way to initially calibrate in a situation,
where there are little expectations in the first place.
Take the example of Beth, a woman in her late twenties
working at a ‘tech-hub’ in Berkeley, California. In this
excerpt of an interview with FD, Beth talked about
using a Fitbit, a device which records the number of
steps taken per day by the user. It measures the distance
travelled through these steps and the equivalent
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number of flights of stairs climbed based on elevation.
The device, which is roughly the size of the length of a
human thumb and can be attached to a bra-strap or put
in a pocket, connects via Bluetooth to a smartphone
device on which the user’s activity data is wirelessly
uploaded and visualised.
Beth: I was given this [Fitbit] from my dad . . . what’s
interesting is that, like, the main thing that I’ve been
using this for is, at the end of the day, figuring out how
many steps I took, and then kind of being able to con-
nect that to how, like, I’m feeling, how my body is
feeling. It’s really interesting because I feel like the
way that I feel after walking, let’s say, 6000 steps a
day, compared to, like, let’s say, 26,000 steps in a
day, a lot of times I, like, kind of feel the same. Like,
I don’t feel more tired. I wouldn’t really know that
I had walked a lot more on, like, day one versus day
two. So that’s really interesting. But I mean, the big
thing that I really like as far as, like, the goal settings,
so like, if I reach ten thousand steps in a day, it pauses
and lets me know. So I’ll definitely, like, make an effort
to reach that every day. But you know, at the end of the
day if I go home and I’m like, you know, 2–3000 steps
short, I’m not going to take another walk around the
neighbourhood to meet that.
FD: Yeah, that’s interesting. So, have you found that
sometimes you haven’t realised how many steps you’ve
taken, when it said 26,000 as opposed to the 6000?
Beth: Yeah, and I really would not know that’s the
steps. I mean, maybe I’m just really not self-aware,
but it’s been interesting for me to really just kind of
connect, you know, number of steps to how my body’s
feeling at the end of the day . . . Because you would
think that without this, I would somehow kind of . . .
be able to know how much I’ve walked. That’s really
not the case.
Beth said that she was unable to tell the difference
between days when she walks 6000 steps and when
she walks 26,000 steps: she was not more tired, and
she largely felt the same. She told FD that she felt as
though she was not really self-aware and that she used
the device to be able to connect the amount of steps she
had taken in the day with how her body was feeling.
It is important to note that Beth does not refer spe-
cifically to the algorithm here, but only the device that
she uses. However, within the device, there is of course
an algorithm determining metrics like stride length,
what counts as a step, categorising certain movements
as being walking rather than cycling for instance, ele-
vation gained, and so on. This algorithm is then con-
verted into numbers and data visualisations that are
shown on the smartphone app so that the user can be
informed of all of these metrics. These are the very
metrics that allow Beth to ‘connect’ the amount of
steps she is taking in a day with how her body feels.
The last part of the conversation above really clarifies
the point that the device and the data are really crucial
for her to be able to know/feel how many steps she has
taken in the day. She was almost surprised at herself
that she did not seem to have any intuitive indicator of
her daily activity without the app. There is a calibration
taking place here: the device helps her to calibrate her
intuitive bodily feelings with the number of steps she
has taken as measured by her device.
Beth’s case is at odds with other accounts of the
effects of algorithms and data on the self. Other the-
ories point to the potentially alienating features of such
devices: Gardner and Jenkins (2016: 4), for example,
argue that ‘there are few technological experiences
with more potential for creating a sense of disembodied
alienation than seeing one’s physical self portrayed
two-dimensionally as data via algorithmic code.’. This
Heideggerian view of technological alienation, how-
ever, seems to be refuted by our example here which
shows the opposite to be the case. Rather than being
alienating, Beth is in fact enabled by the device and
data to be more in touch with her bodily feelings, sup-
posedly giving her the ability to connect her daily activ-
ity with how she feels at the end of each day.
Further, there is another aspect to this device and
the algorithm within it. And that is the part where it
normalises certain behaviour and has the effect of chan-
ging the way Beth behaves to a certain extent, without
being too overbearing. Beth says that the device will let
her know when she has reached the goal of 10,000 steps
and therefore she makes a concerted effort to try and
reach that every day. However, the pull of this goal is
not so overbearing that it compels her to get out of her
house and go for an additional walk just for the sake of
meeting that goal.
In this case, we see how calibration might occur with
someone who does not have any strong sense of how
they are feeling and so are happy to have the technol-
ogy help them to connect their activity with bodily feel-
ings. It is almost like an exercise in learning how to feel
using the device and the algorithms. Recalibration is
thus made possible in future uses of the Fitbit as her
bodily feelings in conjunction with the device start to
become more normalised and intuitive. We can imagine
that deviations from these expectations may kickstart a
whole new process of recalibration.
Discussion: Recalibration
These examples of counting and accounting share a
very similar root: they are both practices as old as
numerical digits themselves, and yet, the digitisation
of these practices are changing the way in which
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people engage with them. They both, therefore, provide
wonderfully complex ground from which to explore
and understand how algorithmic outputs are adjusted
with tacit knowledge, intuition, and ideas about nor-
malcy and normativity – in other words, how they are
recalibrated. Throughout our respective ethnographic
engagements, we have shown three ways that recalibra-
tion is predominantly done.
Relative recalibration takes place to identify the rela-
tions between numbers suggested by the algorithms. It
follows an initial inspection as any given number can
seem very big or small on its’ own. This is where the
recalibration starts. Alice, for example, considers differ-
ent posts found in the taxpayer’s yearly tax return state-
ment and makes a comparison between them. If all
numbers are present and the relations between them
seem normal, she goes on to the next point on her pro-
cedural list, otherwise she pauses to probe further into
the respective numbers. She unpacks a calculated
number and moves on to a tacit recalibration.
Elsewhere, Beth recalibrates how she feels about the
number of steps she has taken when comparing that
figure with the number of steps that her Fitbit tells
her that she ought to have done (10,000). She may
think that 4000 is a good amount, but in relation to
the number that the algorithm has determined is a
healthy number of average steps that a person ought
to take in a given day, it seems much lower and she
must decide whether or not she wants to make the effort
to achieve a number closer to the recommended
number.
Tacit recalibration illustrates the process where the
algorithmic output is set in relation to what has been
the human’s own experience. Drawing on her own
experience of past audit control visits, Alice ‘knows’
the set-up of a normal business office and the work
being performed. Yet, the world changes and so do
business opportunities which, according to Agency
strategies in dealing with taxpayers, means being
empathetic to the taxpayer’s explanation of what is
necessary in order to carry out the business. The sur-
roundings and daily activities of a forest farmer are
probably quite different from that of a PR consultant,
yet they both have to account for their business activ-
ities and Alice has to understand each of ‘their’ realities
and relate it to the calculated numbers present in each
of their tax return statements. Engaging with the reality
of a taxpayer includes browsing through the binders
and comparing invoices with calculated amounts in
the ledgers while comparing it to her impression of
the visit as well as her understanding and knowledge
of what ‘normal’ business activities entails. In the
best of worlds, it is a normative stand, but Alice also
needs to recalibrate her decision in terms of being
reasonable.
Similarly, when Stephen and Tamar’s respective
sleep tracking technologies tell them that they had a
sleep of certain quality, they start to ask questions
about their experience and how they felt. They are
unconvinced by the data from the device and start to
engage with their intuitions and feelings to inform them
of how their sleep was. Do they feel tired? Do they
remember having many interruptions during the
night? Do they remember lying awake for a long time
before they eventually drifted off? Here, they take into
consideration their lived experience and intuitions
much more than taking the reading on their device
for granted, and in both these cases they challenge the
numbers shown to them.
Anomalous recalibration relates to abnormal, even
dangerous, situations where the algorithmic output is
trusted. The human decision-maker does not dare to
question the algorithm’s correctness. In the case of
Emma and her bowels, she has a vague idea that she
has unusual bowel movements, and at some point, far
from seeing it as indicative of a potentially fatal condi-
tion, she even sees it as being convenient. After her app
records and stores the information of her bowel move-
ments over a period of time, she sees a pattern and
becomes much more worried that they are not just unu-
sual but statistically abnormal, and thus starts to worry
about the potential of bowel cancer. She now sees what
was once, perhaps, a convenient pattern is now a ‘toxic’
thing that is something to worry about. Whilst the algo-
rithm here has meant that her intuitive feelings are
given less weight than the app, which indicates to her
that something may not be right, she is of course draw-
ing upon knowledge of what she has learnt about bowel
cancer, what the algorithm implies about ‘normalcy’,
and what is an appropriate number of times to empty
her bowels. There is recalibration going on here, but it
has gone in favour of the algorithm.
When Alice realises that there are more serious irre-
gularities between the taxpayer’s book-keeping, his
business activities and what has been reported to the
Tax Agency, she needs to correct the taxpayer to bring
the taxpayer’s position back to normal – one without
errors. Although the taxpayer is wrong in the given tax
return, it is a delicate situation. She acknowledges the
different capacities of these small businesses when she
points out that the owners do not run a business due to
their terrific book-keeping skills, but because they are
good at the work they provide. She says she gives the
taxpayers the benefit of doubt as to their record-keep-
ing. But if the calculated numbers are too deviant from
what a normal situation entails, she is compelled to be
professional and act on the algorithmic output to cor-
rect errors.
Recalibration is thus seen as a way to understand the
relationships between algorithmic outputs and ideas
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about normalcy in both the case of the quantified selves
and of the Swedish tax auditors. In these cases, nor-
malcy and reasonableness can be seen as proxies for
navigating the overarching normativities implied in
each situation – whether this be the achievement of
10,000 steps and 8 hours sleep, or spending a reason-
able amount of money on business expenses.
Recalibration as a concept thus allows us to articulate
the different normative notions that people consider
when making decisions based on information gleaned
from algorithmic output.
Conclusion
Through our ethnographic encounters with counting
and accounting we have examined how decisions are
adjusted between the output of algorithmic calculations
and the experiences, and the tacit knowledge, of
humans dealing with issues that stem from those calcu-
lations. We call this act of comparative adjustment
recalibration as it involves making a decision about
something – the algorithmic output – and then chan-
ging that decision given some other input, e.g. other
numbers given by the algorithms, own experience, or
contextual knowledge from elsewhere.
Often, the digital devices and systems that we
focussed on made implicit or explicit recommendations
for action which are, ultimately, powered by algorithms
that take into account all of the data that is being col-
lected and stored. Despite this, however, it was not the
case that these outputs were unquestioningly thought of
as gospel, and therefore that any action commanded by
the technology was then taken. We found many
instances where there was a ‘technological dissonance’
between what the user expected and what the technol-
ogy implied (Dudhwala, 2017). In the cases of those
quantifying themselves, if the user had one idea about
the state of their body or some aspect of their behav-
iour, but the algorithm stated otherwise, a process
occurred to align the two of them. Likewise, in the
tax examples, the auditor often had an idea of the
state of the audited taxpayer and their behaviour
which was then compared to the algorithmic output.
We found that when the algorithmic output indicates
something different from normal situations, be that the
reasonably compliant taxpayer or an abnormal account
of the self, there will be a recalibration, whether rela-
tive, tacit, or anomalous, to return the situation back to
perceived normalcy. This involves deliberate work for
the individual reacting to these abnormal situations,
accounting and recalibrating far more than just the
algorithmic output. Algorithmic outputs are thus
never considered in isolation, but incorporate the indi-
viduals’ tacit knowledge, experiences, and intuition to
allow for moments where recalibration can occur.
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Note
1. A large number of the decisions tend towards nothing fur-
ther being done, and as such, it has been suggested that
both the sampling and the following handling of audit
controls could be made more efficient (Riksrevisionen,
2012). This official criticism of inefficient usage of algo-
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